INTRODUCTORY ESSAY TO “GROVES SCHEME ON
RESTRICTED DOMAINS”
Bengt Holmstrom
Like many of Bob’s students, I began my career in operations research. Before
going to Stanford in 1974 I spent two years as an operations research analyst
at a Finnish conglomerate (Ahlstrom Oy). At Stanford, I ﬁrst enrolled in the
master’s program in operations research, thinking of returning to my old job after a year. Fortunately, those plans changed when I learned of and got accepted
into the ph.d. program at the gsb.
The ﬁrst economics class I ever took was Bob’s legendary Multi-Person Decision Theory class. I didn’t understand very much of the material (it would
have been prudent to go for something a little easier at ﬁrst), but it became
quickly clear that I was listening to an exceptional mind. Bob wasn’t polished
in a strictly pedagogical sense, but the things he chose to emphasize were fascinating. He spent a lot of time on problem formulation: how to transform a
question into an economically relevant, mathematically tractable model. “Formulation is 90% of the analysis” was one of his favorite phrases, though it took
me a long time to fully appreciate the signiﬁcance of this lesson.
Early in the class I asked Bob what I should read if I wanted to understand
incentives better. My interest in incentives had been raised by the problems
I had encountered when trying to implement a large-scale corporate planning
model at Ahlstrom. It was evident that the information that divisions supplied
was distorted as managers tried to game the model. Bob suggested that I look at
Groves’ recent paper “Incentives in Teams,” which, he said, dealt with the exact
problem I was talking about. I rushed to read it - and was gravely disappointed.
I remember saying to myself that if this is what economists have to say about
incentives then I better work on something else. To someone with an operations
research background, the model looked hopelessly unrealistic.
The paper in this volume shows that despite this ﬁrst, unhappy encounter
with the economics of incentives, I eventually came around to appreciate both
the economic approach and Groves’ scheme (but not before I had wasted a
semester working on integer programming). The paper is very much a product
of Bob’s wonderful, informal research group that I participated in as a thesis
writer. Among the regular participants at that time were Takao Kobayashi, who
worked with Bob on mechanism design, Froystein Gjesdal, who worked with Joel
Demski on moral hazard, William Thomson, who worked with Mordecai Kurtz

c 2002 by the author. All Rights Reserved. Published exclusively by the
Copyright 
Berkeley Electronic Press with the permission of the author.

Holmstrom

Introduction to Holmstrom

2

on social choice; and Barry Weingast and Linda Cohen, who worked with Roger
Noll on political science (all three visiting from Cal Tech).
The group met weekly. The meetings were almost entirely unstructured. We
would often come to a session not knowing who would speak and on what topic.
Whoever had something to say would go to the black board and sketch out a
model, a problem or just bring up an interesting issue worth thinking about.
We never ran out of topics to discuss, perhaps because the pressure to deliver
new ideas was so high. It was part fun, part scary and above all tremendously
educating and inspiring.
My paper on Groves’ scheme got started with a simple question: do there
exist incentive schemes, based on joint output alone, that implement eﬃcient
outcomes in a model of joint production (“moral hazard in teams”)? Assuming
diﬀerentiability, the answer is readily seen to be negative. When I presented
this little discovery in the discussion group, I was surprised to see Bob get quite
enthusiastic about it. He was convinced the idea could be leveraged further.
Inspired by this, I went on to ask the same implementation question in the
Groves’ model using the same diﬀerentiable approach. I wanted a method for
deriving Groves’ scheme (something Groves’ paper didn’t do). The main insight
was to note that the condition for an eﬃcient allocation could be recast as the
condition that the social planner wants truthful revelation (equation (6) in the
paper). With this minor reformulation, Groves’ scheme popped right out as the
unique solution to a trivial diﬀerential equation. Validating Bob’s thesis, the
reformulation was 90% of the paper. The remaining 10% is a technical exercise
showing that uniqueness obtains under quite weak diﬀerentiability conditions.
As an advisor, Bob was extremely generous with his time. He told me at
the outset that he liked to put students on a regular schedule: discipline was
important for doing good work. I met with him almost weekly. It was a great
incentive scheme. I didn’t dare to go to his oﬃce empty-handed and usually
managed to produce something that at least could be discussed (often late the
night before). Bob would rarely take a strong stand on issues, but I learned
to read his delicate, invaluable signs of approval or disapproval. His comments
were relatively few, but deep and insightful. It usually took me a long while to
ﬁgure out their true meaning — in some cases I’ve ﬁgured it out only years later.
His ability to interpret the literature and see connections between my results
and earlier work were invaluable. And just as importantly, his whole vision of
where the ﬁeld was headed and the role that incentive theory and information
would come to play in economics were a strong encouragement for a young,
aspiring theorist.
It is only in retrospect that I have come to appreciate how unique my education at Stanford really was. It’s hardly an exaggeration to say that modern
game theory would not be what it is today without the foresight and enormous
inspiration that Bob provided not just to his immediate students, but a whole
generation of young scholars around the world.

